The main factors that have made Greek Cyprus unwilling to help solve the dispute on the island are international powers requiring that the roots of the problem and the responsible party be disregarded and clearing the path for Greek Cyprus’s membership to EU.
Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktaş has been characterized as intransigent, but this does not conform to reality. As a matter of fact, it was the Greek side that rejected all UN proposals for reunification of the island.
The Turkish side, while in favor of Cuellar’s “Set of Proposals” in March 1986, Boutros-Ghali’s “Set of Ideas” in 1992 and finally the Annan plan on April 24, 2004, the Greek side, beguiling the international community to the last minute, looking for support by pretending to be the underdog and supporting it until the very last moment, was always the side against a solution.
On top of that, although the current administration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) came to power on rallying cries of a solution to the Cyprus problem and EU membership, the Cyprus problem is drifting away from a solution. In this context, it is possible to line up the basic elements complicating the solution as follows.
* International recognition of Greek Cyprus, as the continuation of the 1960 Cyprus government since March 1964.
* The resolutions of UN Security Council based on this concept, which reverberated in the leading cases at the European Court of Human.
* March 4, 1964/181: The creation of a UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus and official recognition of Greek Cyprus as the government of Cyprus.
* Nov. 18, 1983/541: Considering the declaration of the KKTC as legally invalid.
* May 13, 1984/550: Defining the formation of the KKTC as a “secessionist action” and calling for the transfer of Varosha to the administration of the UN.
* Greek Cyprus’ possession of rights and the possibility of becoming a member, to participate, vote and speak on behalf of the whole island, in international organizations.
* Alongside the conflicting benefits and arguments of both communities on the island, the involvement of regional and global powers in the Cyprus problem.
* The participation of too many international actors, topping the judicial framework of the 1960 agreement.
* The double standards of the EU by accepting Greek Cyprus as a full member irrespective of international law.
* Greek Cyprus’s position in the decision-making side on Turkey’s membership talks with the EU.
* Taking advantage of the over-willingness of Turkey to join the EU, playing the Cyprus issue as a trump card and transforming it into an EU instrument in the form of a provision.
* The belief of the Greek side that they would get the most compromise by means of threatening Turkey it will veto its EU accession process.
* Aiming to be recognized by Turkey as the legal representative of the Cypriot government by dragging the problem to the judicial organs of the EU.
* Within the short and medium term, the opening of the closed area of Varosha and the approval and exercising of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement by opening Turkish harbors and airports to Greek Cypriot traffic.
* Working to reduce the Turkish Cypriots from a politically equal community to a minority once again and invalidating the existence, rights and status of Turkey on the island.
* Importing the EU as an actor alongside the claims of the Greeks to the solution of the problem by mentioning that the resolution in Cyprus will be within the UN framework and relying on EU principles in the Turkey-EU Negotiation Framework Document and Accession Partnership Document.
* By this method, shifting the solution from the UN floor, where Turkey is a member, to a platform where the EU participates but Turkey and the KKTC do not
* The usage of Greek Cyprus by the other members of the EU who are against the membership of Turkey for other reasons as a subcontractor.
* The continuation of sanctions imposed on the KKTC and no penalty for the Greeks vis-a-vis a resolution.
* In this context, the unwillingness of Greeks to sit down for a solution.
* The extremely nationalist and racial feelings of Greeks stretching to fascism, and rejecting coexistence with the Turkish Cypriots. In addition, the increase in the supporters of neo-Nazism, far-right groups and violent EOKA-like organizations such as Hrisi Avgi/Golden Dawn.
* The role of the Greek Orthodox Church and the Greek Cypriot education system.
* The strong support of the Greek Cypriots for the Pappadopoulos factor, in the April 24 referendum and onwards,
* Greek Cyprus profiting significantly from international laws and propaganda against the Turkish side.
* The conveyance of property affair, which should be the part of a comprehensive and bilateral solution, to the European court by the Greek Cypriots, for a solution within the level of the rights of an individual.
* The efficacy of the Greek Cypriot and Greek lobby within Western countries and their collaboration with the Armenian lobby.
* The psychological operations conducted for years in the KKTC for a solution along the Greek Cypriot thesis.
The final position reached within this framework neither leads to a solution under a joint state due to the obstructions of the Greek Cypriots nor does it leave a gap for the recognition of the KKTC and the lifting of sanctions.